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CASENOTE UPDATE: THE SUPREME COURT RESTRICTS
PLAINTIFF OPTIONS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE
LITIGATION IN AMERICAN ELECTRIC
POWER CO. V. CONNECTICUT
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the rise of environmentally conscious activists more than
thirty years ago, Americans have been concerned over the growing
threat of climate change.1  Once their concerns were planted in the
American consciousness, these activists began seeking justice
through the court system, initially by relying on the Equal Protec-
tion Clause (EPC).2  After realizing that relying on the EPC would
not be possible, plaintiffs in environmental justice cases turned to
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibited any entity
acting with federal power from discriminating on the basis of race;
that option, however, would also prove unfruitful.3  Until recently,
plaintiffs in these cases had attempted to advance theories of public
nuisance, claiming that greenhouse gas emissions contribute heav-
ily to climate change.4 A recent climate change case based on a
public nuisance claim, Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Connecticut (AEP),5
1. See Hadyn Davies, From Equal Protection to Private Law: What Future for Envi-
ronmental Justice in U.S. Courts?, 2 BRIT. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 163, 164-65 (2013) (not-
ing origin of Environmental Justice Movement).  The first environmentally
conscious activists are generally thought to have arisen in 1982. See id.  Residents
of Warren County in North Carolina complained to the state government when
they learned that hazardous soil would be disposed of in a landfill nearby. See id.
Further investigation revealed that similar landfills were all located near communi-
ties populated primarily by minorities. See id. at 165.
2. See id. at 170 (explaining methods by which activists sought remedies).  The
EPC quickly proved to be an unsuccessful basis for claims, as due to the Supreme
Court’s holding in Washington v. Davis, plaintiffs “[i]n effect . . . had to adduce
evidence of intentional racial discrimination in order to obtain redress.” Id.
3. See id. at 171 (detailing environmental plaintiffs’ interest in basing claims
on Title VI).  In Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 494 U.S. 677 (1979), the Supreme
Court implied that a “private right of action existed under Title VI whether for
claims based on intentional discrimination or disparate impact,” which empowered
plaintiffs to seek remedies under disparate impact claims. Id. (citing Cannon, 494
U.S. at 694 (emphasis in original)).  In 2001, however, the Court denied the im-
plied right to private disparate impact claims under Title VI with its holding in
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001). See id. (citing Sandoval, 532 U.S. at
285).
4. See id. at 178 (opining that climate change cases are most often based upon
public nuisance claims).
5. 131 S. Ct. 2527 (2011).
(387)
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altered the landscape of these cases, if only due to the fact that it
was the first of its kind to reach the U.S. Supreme Court.6
In AEP, eight states, New York City, and three land trusts sued
five corporations that owned fossil-fuel-emitting power plants,
claiming the defendants’ carbon dioxide emissions to be effecting
climate change.7  The District Court dismissed these claims “as
presenting non-justiciable political questions,” but the Second Cir-
cuit disagreed and therefore examined the merits.8  It held that the
plaintiffs had successfully stated a public nuisance claim, noting
that because the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) had not
yet promulgated a rule with respect to regulating the emission of
greenhouse gases from power plants, its authority to do so under
the Clean Air Act (CAA) could not override the plaintiffs’ ability to
make a nuisance claim.9  A Note published in Vol. XXII, Issue 2 of
this Journal analyzed the Second Circuit’s decision in the context of
climate change litigation and the impact the decision could have
on future cases in this area of law.10  After the Note was published,
however, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s deci-
sion.11  The Court held “the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it
authorizes displace any federal common law right to seek abate-
ment of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power
plants.”12
This Note updates the law examined in the original Note.  Sec-
tion II studies developments in climate change litigation since the
Supreme Court’s decision in AEP.13  Section III looks at the impact
6. See Davies, supra note 1, at 178-79 (explaining significance of American Elec-
tric to climate change litigation).
7. See 131 S. Ct. at 2534 (revealing parties and plaintiffs’ claim).  To support
the public nuisance claim, the plaintiffs argued that “public lands, infrastructure,
and health were at risk” from the defendants’ actions. Id. (citation omitted).
8. Id. (explaining procedural history).
9. See id. at 2534-35 (detailing Second Circuit’s reasoning) (citations omit-
ted).  The defendants appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. Id.
10. See Michael Schiraldi, Ring Temperatures, Political Questions, and Public Nui-
sances: The Second Circuit Weighs in on the Climate Change Debate in Connecticut v. Amer-
ican Electric Power Co., 22 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 321 (2011) (examining Second Circuit’s
holding).
11. See American Electric, 131 S. Ct. at 2537 (offering holding).
12. Id. (explaining holding).  The Court specifically disagreed with the plain-
tiffs’ claim (and the Second Circuit’s holding) that, because the EPA had not yet
promulgated a rule on the subject, public nuisance actions were available to seek
regulation of greenhouse gases. See id.
13. For a further discussion of these developments, see infra notes 15-52 and
accompanying text.
2
Villanova Environmental Law Journal, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2016], Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/elj/vol27/iss2/8
2016] CASENOTE UPDATE 389
of these new developments and how they may affect future climate
change litigation.14
II. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court, in its consideration of AEP, almost com-
pletely repudiated the Second Circuit’s holding and, therefore, the
plaintiffs’ arguments.15  The Court noted that a subject’s govern-
ance by federal law does not imply that federal courts have the abil-
ity to create such federal law; instead, the Court should leave that
power to Congress.16  It further explained that precedent could not
support a public nuisance claim:
We have not yet decided whether private citizens (here,
the land trusts) or political subdivisions (New York City) of
a State may invoke the federal common law of nuisance to
abate out-of-state pollution. Nor have we ever held that a
State may sue to abate any and all manner of pollution
originating outside its borders.17
In the Court’s opinion, it noted a disagreement between the parties
over whether climate change issues operate on too large a scale to
allow for public nuisance review was irrelevant because Congress
vested the power to regulate carbon dioxide emissions in the EPA.18
14. For a further discussion of the impact, see infra notes 53-65 and accompa-
nying text.
15. See American Electric, 131 S. Ct. at 2540 (detailing holding).  There were
two issues before the court: Article III standing and the public nuisance question.
See id. at 2535.  The Court was split 4-4 on the standing issue as Justice Sotomayor
abstained from the decision, so the Second Circuit’s ruling that the plaintiffs in-
deed had standing was upheld. See id.  The Court overturned the Second Circuit’s
decision on the public nuisance issue, as aforementioned. See id. at 2537.
16. See id. at 2536 (noting Court’s lack of creative power).  The Court ex-
plained that if Congress has not spoken on a federal law subject, the Court should
“adopt the readymade body of state law as the federal rule of decision until Con-
gress strikes a different accommodation.” Id. (quoting United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 740 (1979)).  In this case, however, because multiple
states were involved in the litigation, there was no specific state law for the Court to
rely on; regardless, the Court maintained that it could not override Congress’s
constitutional right to create federal laws. See id.
17. Id. (reviewing lack of precedent for public nuisance claims against climate
change).
18. See id. (explaining reasoning behind refusal to consider scope of public
nuisance review); see generally Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (holding
that greenhouse gases should be considered air pollutants under CAA and, there-
fore, regulatory power lies with EPA).  The defendants alleged that global warming
issues are too complex to be supported by a public nuisance claim in the same way
that smaller pollution concerns can be. See id.  They noted that “[g]reenhouse
gases once emitted ‘become well mixed in the atmosphere[;]’ emissions in New
Jersey may contribute no more to flooding in New York than emissions in China.”
3
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According to the Court, with the EPA having regulatory power over
carbon dioxide emissions, the CAA “displace[s] any federal com-
mon law right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from
fossil-fuel fired power plants.”19  The CAA even provides specific re-
course in situations where the EPA has not prescribed limits on a
given pollutant: aggrieved parties, whether they be states or private
citizens, can petition the EPA for regulation; that regulation would,
of course, be reviewable by the judiciary.20  Further injuring the
plaintiffs’ case was ongoing EPA rulemaking regarding the regula-
tion of greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuel power plants,
which resulted from the settlement of a case in which the AEP
plaintiffs were also involved.21
The Court disregarded the plaintiffs’ allegation that the EPA
could not displace public nuisance law until it set official regula-
tions for greenhouse gas emissions as well.22  Again, the Court em-
phasized the correct avenue for judicial review: “[i]f the plaintiffs in
this case are dissatisfied with the outcome of EPA’s forthcoming
rulemaking, their recourse under federal law is to seek Court of
Appeals review, and, ultimately, to petition for certiorari in this
Court.”23  As such, it ultimately held that the Second Circuit had
erred in its consideration of the issues.24
Id. (citations omitted).  The plaintiffs, conversely, claimed that because they had
only sought relief from the largest corporations, the complexity of the issue was
attenuated by its fairly small focus. See id.
19. Id. at 2537 (detailing reasoning behind Court’s refusal to allow public nui-
sance claim to proceed).
20. See American Electric, 131 S. Ct. at 2538 (citing CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(b)(1)
(2012)) (explaining CAA procedures for setting limits on pollutants).
21. See id. (noting existence of EPA rulemaking on subject of carbon dioxide
emissions).  According to the Court, the rulemaking was scheduled to be com-
pleted by May 2012. See id.  Due to continuing challenges of the proposed
rulemaking, however, no final rule has been published as of February 2016. See
Coral Davenport and Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Deals Blow to Obama’s Efforts to
Regulate Coal Emissions, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/
02/10/us/politics/supreme-court-blocks-obama-epa-coal-emissions-regulations
.html.  For a further discussion of the EPA’s rulemaking on this subject, see infra
notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
22. See American Electric, 131 S. Ct. at 2538 (refusing to follow plaintiffs’ sugges-
tion that common law could hold precedent until EPA promulgated official regu-
lations).  “The Clean Air Act is no less an exercise of the legislature’s ‘considered
judgment’ concerning the regulation of air pollution because it permits emis-
sions until EPA acts.” Id. (citing Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clam-
mers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1, 22 (1981)) (emphasis in original).
23. Id. at 2539 (noting availability of challenge to promulgated rule).  The
Court further noted that the EPA is much better equipped to set emissions stan-
dards than the Court is as the EPA is solely focused on, and has vast knowledge of,
environmental issues. See id. (citing Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)).
24. See id. at 2540 (detailing holding).
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While the Supreme Court seemingly advanced the idea that
only a challenge to specific EPA regulations on greenhouse gas
emission levels is judicially reviewable in its AEP decision, plaintiffs
continued to seek relief for the EPA’s lack of official action.25  As
one commentator noted, one way in which plaintiffs have at-
tempted to circumvent AEP is by making tort claims for the effects
of climate change against corporations that own fossil-fuel power
plants.26  The Ninth Circuit case Native Village of Kivalina v. Exx-
onMobil Corp.27 is an example of such an approach.28  In Kivalina,
the citizens of the nominal Alaskan village were required to relo-
cate due to the melting of an ice barrier which protected the town
from rising levels of the Pacific Ocean; the villagers blamed green-
house gas emissions for the melting.29  After the District Court dis-
missed their claims, the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit.30
The Ninth Circuit upheld the lower court’s decision, explaining
that the AEP holding applied not only to the public nuisance claims
at the center of that case, but also to claims regarding tortious dam-
age caused by greenhouse gas emissions.31  The court therefore de-
termined the EPA’s regulatory power displaced federal common
law and thus, the plaintiffs could not pursue their claim.32  Taking
the holdings of AEP and Kivalina together makes clear that neither
injunctive relief nor damages are available to plaintiffs unless they
are challenging regulatory action (as opposed to lack thereof) by
the EPA.33
25. See Davies, supra note 1, at 180 (explaining that plaintiffs were not de-
terred from challenging greenhouse gas emissions by American Electric holding); see
also Hari M. Osofsky, AEP v. Connecticut’s Implications for the Future of Climate Change
Litigation, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 101, 104 (2011).
26. See Davies, supra note 1, at 180 (examining plaintiff strategies post-Ameri-
can Electric).
27. 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
28. See Davies, supra note 1, at 180; see also Kivalina, 696 F.3d 849 (discussing
plaintiff’s tort claim).
29. See Davies, supra note 1, at 180; see also Kivalina at 863 (detailing facts of
case).  The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers determined that it would cost upwards
of $400 million to relocate the entire village, but that there was no other legitimate
option. See Davies, supra note 1, at 180; see also Kivalina at 863.
30. See Davies, supra note 1, at 180; see also Kivalina at 855 (explaining proce-
dural history).
31. See Davies, supra note 1, at 180; see also Kivalina at 857 (providing reason-
ing behind refusal to allow claim for tortious damage).  The court further noted
that “under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, if a cause of action is displaced,
displacement is extended to all remedies.” Kivalina at 857.
32. See Davies, supra note 1, at 180; see also Kivalina at 858 (holding that Con-
gress gave power to EPA which overrides common law claims).
33. See Davies, supra note 1, at 180 (opining that neither injunctive relief nor
damages are viable opportunities for judicial review under tort law).
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With tort claims completely unavailable, those claiming harm
from greenhouse gas emissions were forced to look to a different
area of law; the plaintiffs in Alec L. v. Jackson34 made a breach of
fiduciary duty claim.35  The plaintiffs in Jackson were five minors
and two environmentally conscious organizations who brought
their claim against the Administrator of the EPA.36  The District
Court of D.C. ruled a fiduciary duty claim was not viable, explaining
that courts have never extended the public trust doctrine “to pro-
tect the atmosphere or impose duties on the federal government,”
which would therefore require it to depart from precedent.37  A fi-
duciary duty claim was particularly unfeasible, according to the
court, because if it were to extend public trust doctrine to the emis-
sion of greenhouse gases, AEP would prohibit the plaintiffs from
seeking relief outside of the EPA’s regulatory power; and, con-
versely, if it were to refuse to extend public trust doctrine, the fed-
eral court would not have federal question jurisdiction over the
claim.38
In Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA,39 the issue of greenhouse
gas emission regulation under the CAA returned to the Supreme
Court.40  The EPA regulatory scheme for pollution requires that
states, for each of the six types of pollutants named by the EPA,
designate areas within their borders “attainment,” “nonattainment,”
34. 863 F. Supp. 2d 11 (D.D.C. 2012); see generally Patrick C. McGinley, Climate
Change and the Public Trust Doctrine, 65 PLAN. & ENVTL. L. No. 8 (2013) (examining
history of public trust doctrine and related litigation).
35. See Jackson, 863 F. Supp. 2d at 12 (noting plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claim).
More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged violations of public trust doctrine through
the defendants’ failure to “protect the atmosphere.” Id.
36. See id. (naming parties to lawsuit).
37. See id. at 13 (noting lack of historical precedent for claim).  The court
further explained that past applications of public trust doctrine to “groundwater,
wetlands, dry sand beaches, non-navigable tributaries, and wildlife” did not affect
the lack of precedent for the facts of Jackson. Id. (citation omitted).
38. See id. at 15-16 (explaining court’s lack of ability to adjudicate based on
fiduciary duty claim).  Though the plaintiffs argued that American Electric applied
only to public nuisance claims, the court explained that the court’s analysis in
American Electric did not limit itself to public nuisance claims and, rather, was
meant to cover all federal common law claims. See id.
39. 134 S. Ct. 2427 (2014).
40. See id. at 2434 (determining permissibility of EPA’s decision that green-
house gas regulations with respect to motor vehicles “automatically triggered per-
mitting requirements under [CAA] for stationary sources”). See also Robert
Barnes, Supreme Court: EPA can Regulate Greenhouse Gas Emissions, with Some Limits,
THE WASHINGTON POST (June 23, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/polit-
ics/supreme-court-limits-epas-ability-to-regulate-greenhouse-gas-emissions/2014/
06/23/c56fc194-f1b1-11e3-914c-1fbd0614e2d4_story.html (noting Court held that
EPA had exceeded limits of its power).
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or “unclassifiable.”41  Any power plants located in “attainment” or
“unclassifiable” areas are subject to special CAA provisions called
Prevention of Significant Deterioration (PSD).42  The EPA, how-
ever, interpreted PSD provisions to apply based on whether the
area in which a power plant is housed meets the relevant designa-
tions for any pollutant rather than the pollutants emitted by the
power plant in question.43  According to the Court, the EPA came
to this decision as a result of rulemaking on motor vehicle emis-
sions stemming from the Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,44
in which the CAA recognized the EPA’s power to regulate carbon
dioxide emissions.45  Once the EPA had determined that it needed
to regulate motor vehicle emissions due to their effect on the envi-
ronment, it decided that such regulations should automatically sub-
ject power plants located in “attainment” or “unclassifiable” areas to
permitting.46
The Supreme Court determined that the EPA unreasonably in-
terpreted the CAA, and therefore, reversed the D.C. Circuit, which
had held the EPA’s interpretation permissible.47  The Court first
explained that nothing in the CAA positively compelled the EPA to
expand its permitting requirements based on the motor vehicle
emission regulations.48  The Court followed up by examining the
41. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2435 (citing CAA § 7407(d)) (detail-
ing requirements for state designation of areas prone to pollution).
42. See id. (explaining statutory requirements).
43. See id. (reviewing EPA’s interpretation of CAA).  According to the Court,
every single area in the United States is designated “attainment” or “unclassifiable”
for at least one of the six pollutants; therefore, every power plant in the country
was subject to PSD provisions in the EPA’s view. See id.  Power plants subject to
PSD provisions must receive a permit from the EPA before they can be “con-
struct[ed] or modif[ied] . . . .” Id. (citing CAA §§ 7474(a)(1), 7479(2)(C)).  These
power plants must also receive a separate operating permit. See id. (citing CAA
§ 7661a(a)).
44. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
45. See Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2436 (explaining effect of Massa-
chusetts v. EPA on EPA’s decision-making).
46. See id. (examining reasoning behind automatic triggering of permitting
requirements for power plants).  The Court noted that the EPA had to revise the
PSD provisions because “the PSD program . . . [was] designed to regulate ‘a rela-
tively small number of large industrial sources,’ and requiring permits for all
sources with greenhouse-gas emissions above the statutory thresholds would radi-
cally expand those programs . . . .” Id. (citation omitted).
47. See id. at 2449 (announcing holding that EPA was not permitted to inter-
pret CAA as it had).  Though Justice Scalia, who announced the judgment of the
court, wrote a plurality opinion, his holding on this topic had a majority backing,
as Justice Alito noted his separate opinion (joined by Justice Thomas) that he
agreed with the holding. See id. at 2455.
48. See id. at 2442 (holding that textual analysis of CAA does not support
EPA’s claim of automatic triggering).
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EPA’s discretionary power to interpret the CAA, and whether the
EPA permissibly interpreted the CAA to allow the EPA to expand
permitting requirements.49  According to the Court, “[a] brief re-
view of the relevant statutory provisions leaves no doubt that the
PSD program . . . [is] designed to apply to, and cannot rationally be
extended beyond, a relative handful of large sources capable of
shouldering heavy substantive and procedural burdens.”50  Further,
the EPA admitted that attempting to satisfy its interpretation of the
CAA would require an overhaul of the PSD program, one which the
Court found implausible.51  Though the Court held that the EPA
could not extend its permitting requirements based on its regula-
tion of motor vehicle emissions, it did further confirm that the EPA
had regulatory authority over greenhouse gases, supporting the
AEP determination that plaintiffs who seek relief for the effects of
greenhouse gas emissions are required to do so by challenging EPA
regulations on those emissions.52
III. IMPACT
Recent developments in climate change litigation do suggest a
way forward for activists, organizations, and even states to challenge
greenhouse gas emissions: through litigation on the appropriate-
ness of EPA regulations.53  One large problem for plaintiffs inter-
ested in regulatory challenges, however, had been the lack of
promulgated regulation on greenhouse gas emissions from fossil-
fuel power plants.54  As far back as the AEP decision, the EPA had
been planning to finalize rulemaking on greenhouse gas emissions,
49. See id. (reviewing EPA’s discretionary powers).
50. Util. Air Regulatory Grp., 134 S. Ct. at 2443 (determining that EPA’s inter-
pretation was unreasonable).  The Court explained that the PSD program is very
costly, both monetarily and procedurally, for those subject to its provisions, includ-
ing a detailed scientific analysis and the allowance of a state-held public hearing on
the matter. See id.
51. See id. at 2444 (explaining issues with EPA’s interpretation).
52. See id. at 2449 (holding that EPA may regulate greenhouse gas emissions
from power plants).  Both the EPA/President Obama and opponents of such regu-
lation saw the holding as a win because the Court confirmed the EPA’s regulatory
authority while placing limits on its power. See Barnes, supra note 40.
53. See Osofsky, supra note 25, at 105; see also Davies, supra note 1, at 188-89
(opining that climate change litigation will be limited to regulatory challenges).  It
is worth noting, however, that because the challenged regulation will rarely have
an impact on race, regulations will most likely be subject to intermediate scrutiny
rather than strict scrutiny, which will lessen the likelihood of plaintiff success. See
Davies, supra note 1, at 189.
54. See Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/
cleanpowerplan/clean-power-plan-existing-power-plants (last updated Feb. 11,
2016) (noting pending judicial review of proposed rule).
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but was unable to do so for an extended period of time.55  Late in
2015, the EPA submitted a final rule, noting that it had held multi-
ple public forums and power plant stockholder meetings, leading it
to continually amend its rule.56  Given the existence of concrete
rulemaking, plaintiffs finally were able to take advantage of the reg-
ulatory challenge option; the Supreme Court granted a stay on ap-
plication on the final rule pending review in cases filed by five
separate groups of plaintiffs.57  Oddly enough, the plaintiffs who
challenged the new regulation were all industrial organizations or
states looking to continue to make greenhouse gas emissions.58
The lack of challenges from activists interested in curbing such
emissions could be seen as evidence suggesting that the EPA’s final
rule favors those activists.59
This is not to say, of course, that the plaintiffs are correct to
seek defeat of the EPA’s final rule.60  The EPA, naturally, feels as
though it will prevail on the merits of these cases.61  One commen-
55. See American Electric, 131 S. Ct. at 2535 (noting EPA’s planned rule promul-
gation by May 2012).  For a further discussion of American Electric, see supra notes
15-26 and accompanying text.
56. See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources:
Electric Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64662-01 at 64704 (Oct. 23, 2015)
(to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 60).  The EPA noted that more than 2,800 people
attended public forums, and almost half spoke at those forums. See id.
57. See Chamber of Commerce v. EPA, No. 15A787, 2016 WL 502658 (U.S.
Feb. 9, 2016); see also Basin Elec. Power Coop. v. EPA, No. 15A776, 2016 WL
502654 (U.S. Feb. 9, 2016), Murray Energy Corp. v. EPA, No. 15A778, 2016 WL
502656 (U.S. Feb. 9, 2016), North Dakota v. EPA, No. 15A793, 2016 WL 502659
(U.S. Feb. 9, 2016), West Virginia v. EPA, No. 15A773, 2016 WL 502947 (Feb. 9,
2016) (staying application of EPA’s final rule on greenhouse gas emission
regulation).
58. See Davenport and Liptak, supra note 21 (examining plaintiffs in chal-
lenges to EPA regulation).
59. See id. (explaining that liberal Supreme Court justices were unopposed to
regulation and that plaintiff’s arguments against regulation focused on economic
benefits of greenhouse gas emissions).
60. See id. (noting President Obama’s commitment to current version of
rule).  The rule is based heavily in an international climate change pact signed in
December 2015, and President Obama “pointed to the power plant rule as evi-
dence that the United States would take ambitious action, and that other countries
should follow.” Id.
61. See Clean Power Plan for Existing Power Plants, supra note 54 (noting EPA’s
confidence in rule).  A statement on the EPA’s website reads:
On February 9, 2016, the Supreme Court stayed implementation of the
Clean Power Plan pending judicial review. The Court’s decision was not
on the merits of the rule. EPA firmly believes the Clean Power Plan will
be upheld when the merits are considered because the rule rests on
strong scientific and legal foundations. For the states that choose to con-
tinue to work to cut carbon pollution from power plants and seek the
agency’s guidance and assistance, EPA will continue to provide tools and
support. We will make any additional information available as necessary.
9
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tator, conversely, is of the opinion that the EPA may have over-
stepped its bounds by suggesting it has the authority to propose
regulations that replace fossil fuels with renewable energy op-
tions.62  That commentator further notes that, as a result of the
many changes made to the rule by the EPA between its initial pro-
posal and the final version, a court could find that the final rule was
not a “logical outgrowth” of the initial proposal.63  Similarly, oppo-
nents of the rule explained that the departure from the initial pro-
posal has cost states “countless dollars” in attempts at
implementation.64  Regardless of the ultimate victor, though, the
regulatory challenge approach is cemented as the best, and likely
only, way for plaintiffs to enter into future climate change
litigation.65
Matthew R. Weiss*
Id.
62. See Jonathan H. Adler, Placing the Clean Power Plan in Context, THE WASH-
INGTON POST (Feb. 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-con
spiracy/wp/2016/02/10/placing-the-clean-power-plan-in-context/ (examining
EPA’s renewable energy considerations).
63. See id. (detailing number of changes between proposed rule and final
rule).
64. See Davenport and Liptak, supra note 21 (explaining plaintiffs’ arguments
against rule).  The attorney general of West Virginia said that the stay “protect[ed]
workers and sav[ed] countless dollars as our fight against its legality continues.”
Id.
65. See Osofsky, supra note 25, at 105 (noting that courts have left regulatory
challenges as the only option for climate change litigation).
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.S., 2013, The College of New Jersey.
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